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BANKRUPTCY LAW-THIRD CIRCUIT APPLIES SECTION I 110 OF
BANKRUPTCY CODE TO SALE-LEASEBACK TRANSACTIONS
In re Continental Airlines (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code (the
Code), creditors are prohibited from repossessing or collecting assets
from bankrupt debtors.' The increasing number of airlines facing bank-
ruptcy, however, prompted Congress to enact section 1110 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code. Section 1110 protects financiers of aircraft while also
allowing airlines to increase their capital at a lower interest rate.2 Spe-
1. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988). Section 362 provides in relevant part:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, a petition
filed under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title... operates as a stay,
applicable to all entities, of-(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issu-
ance or employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or
other action or proceeding against the debtor that was or could
have been commenced before the commencement of the case
under this title, or to recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of
the estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of
the case under this title;
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of
property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the
estate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against prop-
erty of the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of
the debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the
debtor that arose before the commencement of the case under this
title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case under this title against any
claim against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding
before the United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id. This automatic stay provision generally operates to preclude the creditor
from removing any property in the bankrupt debtor's possession, including
property that has been leased. Id.; In re Continental Airlines, 932 F.2d 282, 283
(3d Cir. 1991).
2. Continental, 932 F.2d at 290-91. The legislative history of § 1110 states
that the purpose of this section is to "encourage new financing in the transporta-
tion industry and to promote modernization of the industry by protecting equip-
ment financiers." Glenn S. Gerstell & Kathryn Hoff-Patrinos, Aviation Financing
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cifically, section 1110, which is based on sections 77(j) and 116(5) of the
previous Code,3 provides an exemption from the automatic stay for cer-
tain aircraft which are in the possession of an airline involved in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. 4 The exemption is limited to "(1) a holder of a
3. Sections 77(j) and 116(5) of the previous Bankruptcy Code were precur-
sors to § 1110 of the current Bankruptcy Code. Continental, 932 F.2d at 290
(citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 205(j), 516(5) (1976) (repealed)). Section 77(j), enacted in
1935, gave special protection to financiers of certain railroad equipment which
allowed investors to recover their property during a railroad's bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Id. at 289. Section 77(j) provided:
The title of any owner, whether as trustee or otherwise, to rolling stock
equipment leased or conditionally sold to the debtor, and any right of
such owner to take possession of such property in compliance with the
provisions of any such lease or conditional sale contract, shall not be
affected by the provisions of this section.
11 U.S.C. § 205(j) (1976) (repealed). Under this provision, railroads financed
transportation equipment separately from other assets of the railroad through a
form of financing called a "railroad equipment trust." Continental, 932 F.2d at
289. The railroad equipment was "placed in a trust and leased or conditionally
sold to the railroad." Id. The trustees of the equipment usually had priority
over the other creditors of the railroad. Id. This special protection was given to
financiers of railroad equipment "because the high cost and long life span of
rolling stock, combined with the railroads' frequently precarious financial situa-
tions, made such equipment an extraordinarily risky investment. Such risks were
magnified if the secured property could not be recovered promptly in bank-
ruptcy proceedings." Id. at 289 (citing Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at
5-6).
Section 77(j) was extended to the airline industry in 1957 by the enactment
of § 116(5) of the Bankruptcy Act. Id. at 290 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 516(5) (1976)
(repealed)). Section 116(5) provided in pertinent part:
[T]he title of any owner, whether as trustee or otherwise, to aircraft...
leased, subleased, or conditionally sold to any air carrier ... and any
right of such owner or of any other lessor to such air carrier to take
possession of such property in compliance with the provisions of any
such lease or conditional sale contract shall not be affected by the pro-
visions of this chapter if the terms of such lease or conditional sale so
provide.
11 U.S.C. § 516(5) (1976) (repealed). Congress enacted this section to provide
smaller airlines with the necessary capital at lower interest rates, so that they
could more easily replace old aircraft with modern fleets. H.R. REP. No. 944,
85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957), reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1926. Congress
hoped that § 116(5) "would result in an increased availability of capital and at a
lower interest rate than would be demanded under present conditions and
would cause extensive use of equipment trust financing as the financial basis for
a major reequipment program." Continental, 932 F.2d at 290 (quoting H.R. REP.
No. 944, supra, reprinted in 1957 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1926). In 1968, Congress pro-
vided similar protection for financiers in the shipping industry, 11 U.S.C.
§ 516(6) (1976) (repealed), for the same purpose of increasing the availability of
capital at lower interest rates. H.R. REP. No. 1932, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968),
reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4279, 4280.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1988). Section 1110 provides:
(a) The right of a secured party with a purchase-money equipment se-
curity interest in, or of a lessor or conditional vendor of, whether as
trustee or otherwise, aircraft, aircraft engines, propellers, appliances,
or spare parts ... that are subject to a purchase-money equipment se-
curity interest granted by, leased to, or conditionally sold to, a debtor
2
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purchase-money equipment security interest (PMESI) in aircraft or a
conditional vendor of aircraft and (2) a lessor of aircraft."5 Section
1110 therefore allows lessors of aircraft which are leased to an air carrier
to repossess the aircraft if the lessee air carrier files for bankruptcy,
although the air carrier can prevent repossession by curing its defaults
within sixty days. 6
that is an air carrier ... to take possession of such equipment in compli-
ance with the provisions of a purchase-money security agreement,
lease, or conditional sale contract, as the case may be, is not affected by
section 362 or 363 of this title or by any power of the court to enjoin
such taking of possession, unless-
(1) before 60 days after the date of the order for relief under
this chapter, the trustee, subject to the court's approval, agrees to
perform all obligations of the debtor that become due on or after
such date under such security agreement, lease, or conditional sale
contract, as the case may be; and
(2) any default, other than a default of a kind specified in sec-
tion 365(b)(2) of this title, under such security agreement, lease, or
conditional sale, as the case may be-
(A) that occurred before such date is cured before the ex-
piration of such 60-day period; and
(B) that occurs after such date is cured before the later
of-
(i) 30 days after the date of such default; and
(ii) the expiration of such 60-day period.
Id. Section 1110 provides that the right of lessors to repossess their leased air-
craft is not affected by the automatic stay provision of § 362. Louis B. Goldman,
et al., Repossessing the Spirit of St. Louis: Expanding the Protections of Sections 1)10 and
1168 of the Bankruptcy Code, 41 Bus. LAw. 29, 42 (1985). Additionally, a court
may not enjoin lessors from repossessing their aircraft unless the airline can
cure its defaults within the 60-day cure period. Id.
5. Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 2. A "purchase-money equip-
ment security interest" (PMESI) is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code, but it is
similar to a "purchase money security interest" (PMSI), which is defined in Arti-
cle 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (U.C.C.). Id. at 10-11; see also U.C.C. § 9-
107 (1977). The legislative history of § 1110 suggests that it should be inter-
preted in accordance with state law under the U.C.C. Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos,
supra note 2, at 10. Section 9-107 of the U.C.C. provides:
A security interest is a "purchase money security interest" to the
extent that it is
(a) taken or retained by the seller of the collateral to secure all or part
of its price; or
(b) taken by a person who by making advances or incurring an obliga-
tion gives value to enable the debtor to acquire rights in or the use of
collateral if such value is in fact so used.
U.C.C. § 9-107 (1977).
6. Continental, 932 F.2d at 284. This cure period was added to § 1110 "to
soften the effect of the prior law, which was considered 'harsh in [its] applica-
tion.' " Id. at 290. If the debtor cures its defaults within 60 days, the lessor
cannot repossess the aircraft. Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 2-3. The
debtor can cure its defaults by agreeing "to perform all its obligations under the
relevant security agreement, lease or conditional sale contract according to its
pre-bankruptcy terms." Id. at 3.
Additionally, the lessor cannot repossess the aircraft unless it has provided
for a right to repossession in the lease or security agreement for the aircraft. Id.
3
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Airlines finance their aircraft and aircraft equipment in several
ways.' Airlines finance aircraft that are newly constructed, used aircraft
that are new to the airline, and aircraft which are neither newly con-
structed nor new to the airline.8 This third category of aircraft includes
"lease renewals, sale and leaseback transactions, and the use of aircraft
previously owned by an airline free-and-clear as collateral for financ-
ing."9 Aircraft in this category are generally referred to as non-acquisi-
tion financing because they do not result in the addition of new aircraft
to the airline.' 0 Commentators have suggested that section 1110 clearly
applies to newly constructed aircraft and used aircraft new to the airline,
but have questioned the application of the section to non-acquisition
financing of used aircraft previously owned by the airline, such as air-
craft subject to a sale-leaseback transaction.'1
The Third Circuit recently addressed the issue of whether section
1110 applies to sale-leaseback transactions or only to acquisition financ-
ing. 12 In In re ContinentalAirlines,'3 the Third Circuit resolved this uncer-
tainty when it held that section 1110 applies to sale-leaseback
If such a provision exists, a court may not enjoin the financier from repossessing
the aircraft. Id. at 3-4.
7. James W. Giddens & Sandor E. Schick, Section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code:
Time for Refueling?, 64 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109, 123 (1990).
8. Id. For a discussion on how Continental financed its fleet, see infra notes
21-22 and accompanying text.
9. Giddens & Schick, supra note 7, at 123.
10. Id. The first two categories of aircraft, newly constructed and used air-
craft, are referred to as acquisition financing because they result in the addition
of new aircraft to the airline. Continental, 932 F.2d at 284.
11. Giddens & Schick, supra note 7, at 123 (noting that "[i]t is reasonably
clear that the first two types of transactions-those involving new aircraft, or
aircraft new to the airline-are within section 1110, but it is not so clear with
respect to the third type"). Other commentators, however, have come to the
opposite conclusion. See, e.g., Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 25-26
(suggesting that sale-leaseback transactions are covered under § 1110).
12. Continental, 932 F.2d at 282. A sale-leaseback transaction occurs when
an air carrier sells aircraft to a financier and then immediately leases it back.
Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 24. These transactions "are widely
used in the airline industry as a means of raising working capital." Continental,
932 F.2d at 284. Sale-leasebacks may also be part of a "package deal" in which
the airline buys new aircraft from a manufacturer, then enters into a sale-lease-
back transaction with a financier. Id. According to Continental, these "package
deals" are acquisition transactions because "they result in the addition of air-
craft to the fleet." Id. As discussed supra note 10, acquisition financing occurs
when an airline acquires newly constructed aircraft or used aircraft which is new
to the airline.
For a discussion of whether sale-leaseback transactions are covered under
§ 1110, see Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 24 (addressing issue of
whether sale-leaseback transactions should qualify for § 1110 protection); Gid-
dens & Schick, supra note 7, at 123 (suggesting that it is unclear whether sale-
leaseback transactions fall within § 1110).
13. 932 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1991).
4
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transactions. 14 The Continental court reached the same result as two
otherjurisdictions that previously decided the issue. 15 As a result of this
Third Circuit decision, financiers of aircraft will be able to repossess air-
craft subject to sale-leaseback transactions where the debtor air carrier is
unable to cure its default within the sixty-day statutory period. 16 This
bright line rule will have the effect of making financiers more willing to
engage in these transactions, thereby helping ailing airlines. 17
II. DISCUSSION
A. Facts and Procedural History
On December 3, 1990, Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental) filed
for bankruptcy under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.18 The credi-
tors in this case had entered into sale-leaseback transactions with Conti-
nental and wanted to repossess their leased aircraft pursuant to section
1110.19 On January 16, 1991, Continental filed a motion seeking a dec-
laration that certain aircraft which it leased were not subject to section
1110 of the Bankruptcy Code.20
Continental, like many other commercial airlines, leases a majority
of its aircraft. 2 ' The leases consist of acquisition leases, under which
Continental acquires new aircraft through standard leasing agreements,
and non-acquisition leases, under which Continental sells its own air-
craft to a financier and then immediately leases it back. 22 Continental
argued that section 1110 applies only to acquisition leases and not to
sale-leaseback transactions. 23 The bankruptcy court agreed and granted
14. Id. at 287. For a discussion of the holding of Continental, see infra notes
67-72 and accompanying text.
15. See In re Pan Am Corp., 125 B.R. 372 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 929
F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Braniff, Inc., 110 B.R. 980 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990).
For further discussion of these cases, see infra note 29 and accompanying text.
16. Continental, 932 F.2d at 284.
17. For further discussion of the impact of this decision in the Third Cir-
cuit, see infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
18. Continental, 932 F.2d at 283.
19. In re Continental Airlines, 125 B.R. 399, 400 (D. Del.), aff'd, 932 F.2d
282 (3d Cir. 1991). Amicus curiae were filed in support of creditors' position by
five other solvent airlines and the American Association of Equipment Lessors.
Id.
20. Continental, 932 F.2d at 283-84. This motion was opposed by financiers
of the leased aircraft, who served as appellees in this case. Id. at 284.
21. Id. Two-thirds of Continental's current fleet of aircraft consists of
leased aircraft. Id.
22. Id. Continental has 211 aircraft operating under acquisition leases and
104 aircraft operating under non-acquisition leases. Id. For further discussion
of sale-leaseback transactions, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
23. Continental, 932 F.2d at 285. Continental made a separate argument in
the bankruptcy court that § 1110 "was intended to apply only to 'true' leases."
Id. Continental argued that under § 1110 certain transactions that are called
leases are actually "disguised security interests," which are not covered under
the exemption of § 1110. Id. Neither the bankruptcy court nor the district
884 [Vol. 37: p. 880
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Continental's motion.24 The district court, however, reversed the order
of the bankruptcy court.2 5 The district court concluded that sale-lease-
back transactions are included within section 11 10, and therefore the
creditor is entitled to repossess all aircraft operating under non-acquisi-
tion leases. 26 Continental appealed this decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
2 7
B. Analysis
The Third Circuit addressed the issue of whether the word "lease"
in section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code applies to both acquisition and
non-acquisition leases by examining the plain language of the statute
and its legislative history. 28 The court noted at the outset that this iden-
tical question had been answered by two other federal courts, both of
which held that sale-leaseback transactions were covered under section
court, however, reached this issue. Id. The Third Circuit held that § 1110 ap-
plies only to "true" leases, but left open the question of whether Continental's
leases are true leases or disguised security interests. Id. For further discussion
of this issue, see infra notes 63 & 71 and accompanying text.
24. In re Continental Airlines, 123 B.R. 713 (Bankr. D. Del.), rev'd, 125 B.R.
399 (D. Del.), aff'd, 932 F.2d 282 (3d Cir. 1991). The bankruptcy court held that
the term "lessor" in the statute applied only to acquisition leases because the
terms "PMESI" and "conditional vendors," which accompany the term "les-
sors" in the statute, both refer to acquisition devices. Id. at 713. The court
suggested, however, that a sale-leaseback transaction could be part of an acquisi-
tion transaction if, for example, Continental arranged to buy aircraft from a
manufacturer and in the same transaction sold that same aircraft to a financier,
then leased it back. Id. Thus, the bankruptcy court held that Continental's sale-
leasebacks of aircraft were not subject to § 1110 unless those leases were part of
a "package deal" in which the airline also acquired new aircraft. Continental, 932
F.2d at 285.
25. Continental, 125 B.R. at 411. The district court, after determining that it
had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, discussed the doctrine of noscitur a sociis. Id.
at 403-06. The court held that the doctrine did not apply because the term "les-
sor" in § 1110 was intended to have a meaning separate from its adjoining terms
"PMESI" and "conditional vendor." Id. at 406. For a discussion of how the
Third Circuit applied this doctrine, see infra notes 40-44 and accompanying
text.
The district court then examined the legislative history of § 1110 and con-
cluded that Congress did not explicitly exclude sale-leaseback transactions. Con-
tinental, 125 B.R. at 410. Therefore, the district court reversed the decision of
the bankruptcy court and held that sale-leaseback transactions were covered
under § 1110. Id. at 411.
26. Continental, 125 B.R. at 411. The district court concluded that "the leg-
islative history here does not demonstrate a Congressional purpose at odds with
a literal reading of the statute." Id. Thus, it was "compelled to find that Con-
gress meant what it said, and h[e]ld that non-acquisition leases are entitled to
§ 1110 protection." Id.
27. Continental, 932 F.2d at 283.
28. Id. at 286-87. The Third Circuit recognized that the appeal involved "a
straightforward question of statutory interpretation." Id. at 286.
8851992]
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1110.29 The Third Circuit ultimately reached the same conclusion. 30
The Continental court first examined whether it had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal. 3 1 In the Third Circuit, "when the bankruptcy court
issues what is indisputably a final order, and the district court issues an
29. Id. at 287; see In re Pan Am Corp., 125 B.R. 372, 380 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding
that only true leases are protected under § 1110), aff'd per curiam, 929 F.2d 109
(2d Cir. 1991); In re Braniff, Inc., 110 B.R. 980, 985 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990)
(concluding that leased aircraft need not be newly acquired to be protected by
§ 1110).
In Pan Am, the sole issue on appeal was whether lessors involved in "non-
acquisition sale/leaseback transactions" with the debtor airline qualified as "les-
sors" within the meaning of § 1110. Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 373. Pan Am argued
that § 1110 applied only to lessors who "lease(d] aircraft and related equipment
which are new to the airline." Id. The lessors argued that the term "lessor"
applied to any true lessor, and maintained that the legislative history did not
support the position that § 1110 was only intended to apply to aircraft new to
the airline. Id. at 374. The Pan Am court examined the plain language of § 1110
and the legislative history and concluded that if Congress had intended the sec-
tion to apply only to acquisition leases, it would have qualified the word "lease"
to apply only to newly acquired aircraft. Id. at 379. Thus, "[i]f the lease is a true
lease, rather than a disguised loan, and meets all other elements of the statute--
e.g., qualified equipment, qualified air carrier, repossession clause in lease-the
lessor is protected by § 1110." Id. at 380. In an appeal by Pan Am, the Second
Circuit affirmed. In re Pan Am Corp., 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
In the Braniff case, Braniff Airways, Inc. (Airways) set up a subsidiary (Bran-
iff) to operate domestic flights while Airways was involved in a Chapter 11 reor-
ganization. Braniff, 110 B.R. at 981. Braniff entered into leases for aircraft with
a liquidating trust established by Airways, then subsequently filed for bank-
ruptcy. Id. at 982. Braniff sought to prevent the lessors of the aircraft from
repossessing the leased aircraft by arguing that the leases did not fall under
§ 1110 because the aircraft were not new to the airline. Id. For the same rea-
sons the Second Circuit used in Pan Am, the Braniff court held that "[§] 1110 is
not limited to leases that permit aircraft to be newly acquired by the lessee." Id.
at 985. Furthermore, the court concluded that Braniff's leases were subject to
§ 1110 even though the aircraft were not new to the airline. Id.
30. Continental, 932 F.2d at 287 ("The 'identical' question has been consid-
ered in two other cases, where the position now taken by Continental has been
rejected. We reach the same result." (citations omitted)).
31. Id. at 285. Under the United States Code, circuit courts of appeals have
jurisdiction over final orders of the district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988).
The Third Circuit first decided that the order of the bankruptcy court, which
held that Continental's aircraft could not be repossessed by certain lessors, was
a final order. Continental, 932 F.2d at 285. In order to determine if the order of
the bankruptcy court was final, the Third Circuit looked at "the impact of the
issue on the assets of the bankruptcy estate, the necessity for additional fact-
finding on remand, the preclusive effect of a decision on the merits, and further-
ance ofjudicial economy." Id. Because the order of the bankruptcy court "de-
prived the lessors of the ability to repossess their aircraft or force rental
payments," the Third Circuit held that the order was final. Id.; see also United
States v. Nicolet, Inc., 857 F.2d 202, 206 (3d Cir. 1988) (order denying relief
from automatic stay is generally appealable). It was unclear, however, whether
the order of the district court reversing the decision of the bankruptcy court was
appealable because the district court must still determine the issue of whether
Continental's leases should be characterized as leases or disguised security inter-
ests. Continental, 932 F.2d at 285-86. When further fact-finding on remand is
necessary, courts are hesitant to find that an order is final. Id. at 286.
7
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order affirming or reversing, the district court's order is also a final or-
der."3 2 Consequently, the court concluded that it had jurisdiction to
hear the appeal.3 3
The remainder of the court's opinion focused on statutory interpre-
tation of section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code.3 4
1. Plain Language
When interpreting a statute, the Supreme Court of the United
States has held that "[t]he plain meaning of legislation should be con-
clusive, except in the 'rare cases [in which] the literal application of a
statute will produce a result demonstrably at odds with the intention of
32. Continental, 932 F.2d at 286 (quoting In re Marin Motor Oil, 689 F.2d
445, 449 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983)). In Malin Motor Oil,
the appeal came to the Third Circuit after the district court reversed the order of
the bankruptcy court. In re Marin Motor Oil, 689 F.2d 445, 448 (3d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983). The Third Circuit concluded that the order of
the bankruptcy court was a final order, and because it was reviewing the district
court's determination with respect to the order of the bankruptcy court, it was
thus reviewing a final order. Id.
A majority of the United States courts of appeals do not follow the approach
of Marin Motor Oil. Continental, 932 F.2d at 286 n.2; see, e.g., In re St. Charles
Preservation Investors, Ltd., 916 F.2d 727, 729 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (per curiam)
(holding that district court's order remanding case to bankruptcy court not fi-
nal); In re Gould & Eberhardt Gear Mach. Corp., 852 F.2d 26, 28-29 (1st Cir.
1988) (holding that "district court's decision is not final if it remands the matter
back to the bankruptcy judge for 'significant further proceedings' "); In re Mis-
cott Corp., 848 F.2d 1190, 1192 (11 th Cir. 1988) (hoding that decision not final
if on remand bankruptcy court required to exercise significant judicial discre-
tion); Bowers v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 847 F.2d 1019, 1023 (2d Cir. 1988)
(same); In re County Management, 788 F.2d 311, 314 n.4 (5th Cir. 1986) (declin-
ing to follow rule in Marin Motor Oil); In re Commercial Contractors, Inc., 771
F.2d 1373, 1375 (10th Cir. 1985) (concluding that "district court order revers-
ing the bankruptcy court and remanding for further proceedings is not a final
order"); In re Riggsby, 745 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (7th Cir. 1984) (same). But see In
re Gardner, 810 F.2d 87, 90-92 (6th Cir. 1987) (following Malin Motor Oil).
There is an intracircuit split on this issue in both the Eighth and Ninth Circuits.
Compare In re Bestmann, 720 F.2d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1983) (following Malin Mo-
tor Oil) and In re Sambo's Restaurants, 754 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985) (hold-
ing that court had jurisdiction to review order of district court that reviewed
order of bankruptcy court) with In re Vekco, Inc., 792 F.2d 744, 745 (8th Cir.
1988) (holding that "district court decision involving remand normally will not
be considered final for purposes of appeal to this court") and In re Martinez, 721
F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating that "[c]ourts have traditionally not con-
sidered remands as final decisions because of their preference to have a single
'ultimate review on all the combined issues' "). However, because Malin Motor
Oil is the law in the Third Circuit, the Continental court was bound to follow it.
Continental, 932 F.2d at 286 n.2.
33. Continental, 932 F.2d at 286. The court invoked the Malin Motor Oil rule
which provided that an order of the bankruptcy court is final if it "is likely to
effect the distribution of the debtor's assets, or the relationship among the credi-
tors." Id. (quoting In re Brown, 803 F.2d 120, 122 (3d Cir. 1986)).
34. 11 U.S.C. § 1110 (1988). For the relevant text of § 1110, see supra note
8
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its drafters.''35 The Continental court indicated that the plain language
of a statute can be overcome only by clear extrinsic evidence presented
by the party seeking a contrary meaning.3 6
In the present case, Continental attempted to show that the word
"lease" in section 1110 was intended to encompass only acquisition
leases, as opposed to non-acquisition leases.3 7 First, Continental ar-
gued that Congress should have qualified the word "lease" in the statute
to cover only acquisition leases. 38 The court, however, concluded that
the language of the statute can be qualified only if applying the statute
to non-acquisition leases would contradict the intent of the drafters. 39
Using the doctrine of noscitur a sociis, Continental next argued that
the term "lease" could be "discerned only by reference to the other
words that surround it." 40 Because section I 110 refers to "conditional
35. United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 242 (1989) (quoting
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564, 571 (1982)). The Supreme Court
held that it is unnecessary to look beyond the plain language of the statute "as
long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent." Continental, 932 F.2d
at 287 (quoting Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 240-41).
36. Continental, 932 F.2d at 287. The "plain meaning" rule does not pre-
clude the use of extrinsic aids when interpreting a statute. Id. (citing Watt v.
Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981) (quoting Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United
States, 278 U.S. 41, 48 (1928))); see also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research
Group, 426 U.S. 1, 10 (1976) (suggesting that extrinsic evidence may be used to
determine meaning of statute); United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 3 10
U.S. 534, 543 (1940) (noting that "[wihen [the plain] meaning has led to absurd
or futile results ... this Court has looked beyond the words to the purpose of
the act"); Smith v. Fidelity Consumer Discount Co., 898 F.2d 907, 910 (3d Cir.
1990) (holding that court should follow plain meaning rule unless that would be
against purpose of statute).
The Continental court posited that there is no definite rule regarding how
much evidence is required to overcome the plain meaning of a statute, "[b]ut
when the statutory language speaks clearly, a party seeking to counter that lan-
guage must produce other evidence that exhibits at least as much clarity." Conti-
nental, 932 F.2d at 287.
37. Continental, 932 F.2d at 288. Section 1110 "plainly refers to 'lessors' of
aircraft that are 'leased' to an airline." Id. at 287. Sale-leaseback transactions
used by Continental are recognized as valid leases in other legal contexts. See,
e.g., Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978) (sale-leaseback trans-
actions valid under Internal Revenue Code); In re Fashion Optical, Ltd., 653
F.2d 1385, 1389 (10th Cir. 1981) (bona fide sale-leaseback not fraudulent con-
veyance under Bankruptcy Code); Gordon v. Motel City "B" Assocs., 403 F.2d
90 (2d Cir. 1968) (sale-leasebacks valid under New York Bulk Sales Law); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 102 B.R. 335, 343 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (sale-leasebacks
valid under Bankruptcy Code § 365).
38. Continental, 932 F.2d at 288.
39. Id. Accepting Continental's argument would require the court to qual-
ify the plain meaning of the statute. Id. According to the court, it could "only
do so if the application of § 1110 to non-acquisition leases would produce a
result 'demonstrably at odds with the intention of its drafters.' " Id.
40. Id. The term noscitur a sociis literally means "that a thing may be known
by its associates." In re Continental Airlines, 125 B.R. 399, 403 (D. Del.), aff'd,
932 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1991). Under this doctrine, the "meaning of an ambigu-
ous statutory term may be derived from the meaning of accompanying terms."
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sale contracts" and "PMESIs," which are two types of acquisition de-
vices, Continental argued that the term "lease" was intended to apply
only to acquisition leases. 4 1 The court, however, pointed out that Con-
gress had intended to treat the term "leases" differently from "condi-
tional sale contracts" and "PMESIs" because it separated the terms with
the conjunction "or."' 42 Furthermore, the court noted that the doc-
trine's utility decreases when it is used to qualify the plain meaning of a
statute.4 3 Thus, the court concluded that the doctrine of noscitur a sociis
was not applicable to this case because Continental sought to qualify a
word in an unambiguous statute, rather than clarify language that
"plainly encompasses more than one meaning."'4 4
Continental, 932 F.2d at 288. For examples of how this doctrine is applied, see
generally Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961) (applying doc-
trine where "word is capable of many meanings in order to avoid the giving of
unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress"); 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CON-
STRUCTION § 47.16 (Norman Singer ed., 5th ed. 1992) (suggesting that doctrine
should be used only when "meaning of a statute is not clear").
When the meaning of a statute is unclear, the meaning of ambiguous words
may be interpreted by reference to their relationship with other associated
words and phrases. 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, supra, § 47.16.
"Thus, when two or more words are grouped together, and ordinarily have a
similar meaning, but are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be
limited and qualified by the special word." Id. Hence, Continental argued that
"PMESIs" and "conditional sale contracts," which are acquisition devices, are
"special words" that limit and qualify the term "lessor" to apply only to acquisi-
tion devices. Continental, 932 F.2d at 288. For a discussion of why the Continental
court rejected this argument, see infra note 42 and accompanying text.
4 1. Continental, 932 F.2d at 288. For a discussion of PMESIs, see supra note
5.
42. Continental, 932 F.2d at 288. "When Congress has separated terms with
the conjunction 'or,' it is presumed that Congress intended to give the terms
'their separate, normal meanings.' " Id. (quoting Garcia v. United States, 469
U.S. 70, 73 (1984)). Thus, the Continental court rejected the argument that the
term "lease" should apply only to acquisition leases because it is associated in
the statute with other acquisition devices. Id.
43. Id. The Supreme Court has held:
That a word may be known by the company it keeps is... not an invari-
able rule, for the word may have a character of its own not to be sub-
merged by its association. Rules of statutory construction are to be
invoked as aids to the ascertainment of the meaning or application of
words otherwise obscure or doubtful. They have no place.., except in
the domain of ambiguity. Moreover, in cases of ambiguity the rule...
is not exclusive. The problem may be submitted to all appropriate and
reasonable tests, of which Noscitur a sociis is one.
Id. (quoting Russell Motor Car Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 514, 519 (1923));
see also Donovan v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 666 F.2d 315, 327 (8th Cir. 1981) (re-
fusing to use doctrine of noscitur a sociis "when there is no ambiguity, to defeat
the legislative intent and purpose, to make general words meaningless, or to
reach a conclusion inconsistent with other rules of construction").
44. Continental, 932 F.2d at 288. The court explained that
a court is never barred from enlisting the aid of this or any other extrin-
sic tool, but noscitur a sociis is more useful when the statutory language
plainly encompasses more than one meaning. Continental seeks to em-
ploy this rule to qualify language that Congress has left unqualified,
10
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2. Legislative History
The court next examined the legislative history of section 111 0 to
determine the meaning of the term "lease" in the statute.4 5 The court
reviewed the House Reports, which explained the rationale for provid-
ing protection to financiers who lease or conditionally sell aircraft to
airlines.4 6 According to the court, the legislative history did not indicate
congressional intent to exclude non-acquisition financing from the pro-
tection of section 1110. 4 7 Rather, the legislative history of section I 110
is "consistent with an intent to facilitate the procurement of low-cost
capital in general."'4 8 The court concluded that the inclusion of both
acquisition and non-acquisition leases under section 1110 would further
the statute's purpose of increasing the availability of working capital at a
decreased cost.4 9 Moreover, the court agreed with the argument made
by several solvent airlines, serving as amici, that the denial of adequate
protection to the financiers of sale-leaseback transactions would be det-
rather than to clarify a facially ambiguous term. Although we do not
ignore the logic of noscitur a sociis, we believe it does not dictate the
result here, in light of the statute's plain language and evidence indicat-
ing that Congress did not necessarily intend for the term "lease" to be
qualified.
Id.
45. Id. at 289-91.
46. Id. at 290. The House Report provides that § 1110 affords protection
only to leases and conditional sales of equipment, but not to general mortgages.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 240 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5963, 6200. This limitation is based on the theory that
under leases and conditional sales, title to the aircraft does not pass to the
debtor. Id. Therefore, leased property should not be included in the bank-
ruptcy estate of the debtor because it is technically property of the financier. Id.
47. Continental, 932 F.2d at 292 ("There is no clear indication in the legisla-
tive history of § 1110, § 116(5) or § 77(j) that Congress intended to limit pro-
tection to acquisition financing."). For a discussion of §§ 116(5) and 77(j), see
supra note 3.
48. Continental, 932 F.2d at 291; see also In re Pan Am Corp., 125 B.R. 372,
375-76 (S.D.N.Y.) (noting that Congress enacted § 1110 in order to "en-
courag[e] airlines to acquire new equipment . . .[and] continued to be con-
cerned with the need to encourage low cost financing of the airline industry"),
aff'dpercuriam, 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991); In re Braniff, Inc., 110 B.R. 980, 984
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (indicating that "the stated purpose of the bill-protect-
ing lessors and conditional sellers-facilitates the reduction of capital costs to an
airline regardless of whether the transaction contemplates the acquisition of new
equipment ... or the refinancing of existing equipment"). For further discus-
sion of Pan Am and Branif, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
49. Continental, 932 F.2d at 292. The Continental court agreed with the posi-
tion adopted in Pan Am that "[i]ncluding all lessors within the scope of § 1110
•.. is directly consistent with Congress' stated policy of increasing capital availa-
bility at the lowest possible cost." Id. (quoting Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 378). The
Third Circuit based this conclusion on the fact that sale-leaseback transactions
are widely used in the transportation industry and that the legislative history of
§ 1110 does not indicate that Congress intended § 1110 to apply only to acquisi-
tion financing. Id.
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rimental to the entire airline industry. 50
Continental then argued that its sale-leasebacks are the functional
equivalent of general mortgages, which the House Reports state are not
protected under section 1110.51 The court rejected this argument by
noting that sale-leasebacks are different from secured loans, and that a
lessor involved in a sale-leaseback transaction bears a greater risk than a
party to a secured loan such as a general mortgage. 5 2 Specifically, the
lessor of the aircraft retains economic ownership of the property when
the lease expires, while the holder of the security interest does not retain
any interest in the property once the security interest lapses. 53 There-
fore, the court found that aircraft lessors bear a substantial risk because
they rely in part on the residual value of the aircraft for their profits. 54
Accordingly, the court concluded that the legislative history distin-
guished between leases and security interests, and afforded protection
only to leases because "title to the property [leased] remained with the
lessor. ' ' 55
Other provisions of the Code recognize sale-leaseback transactions
50. Id. Because sale-leasebacks are widely used in the airline industry, air-
lines would have difficulty finding financiers for their aircraft if sale-leaseback
transactions were not protected under § 1110. Id.
51. Id. Continental argued that its "leases" were not covered under § 1110
because "its sale-leaseback transactions are the functional equivalent of general
mortgages on specific pieces of equipment." Id. The court, however, did not
believe that Congress, by excluding general mortgages from the reach of
§ 1110, intended to explicitly deny protection to sale-leaseback transactions. Id.
The court specifically stated that "the words 'general mortgage' could refer to a
general mortgage attaching to after-acquired assets, rather than a mortgage at-
taching to a specific piece of equipment." Id. Even if Congress was referring to
loans on specific pieces of equipment, the court did not believe this reference
demonstrated an intent to exclude sale-leaseback transactions from the reaches
of§ 1110. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. The court noted that "[t]he factor of economic ownership reveals
the superficiality of any resemblance between the sale-leaseback transaction and
a secured loan. Where the resulting lease is a true lease, a genuine change in
ownership, evidenced by a transfer of residual risk, has taken place." Id. (quot-
ing Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 25).
54. Id. The lessor of aircraft bears the risk of a "fluctuation in the residual
value of the equipment." Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 23. If the
lease is intended to be a security interest, however, the lessor intends there to be
"no significant residual value beyond the end of the lease term." Id. The Uni-
form Commercial Code has "distinguished a lease from a security interest in
holding that the lease is entitled to section 1110 protection." In re Air Vermont,
Inc., 44 B.R. 446 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1984) (using U.C.C. to distinguish lease from
security interest and giving lease § 1110 protection); see also U.C.C. § 1-201(37)
(1977) (defining security interest).
55. Continental, 932 F.2d at 292-93. The court further noted that "title to
leased property also implies residual economic ownership and its associated
risks, which are still important concerns." Id. at 293. Furthermore, "Congress
distinguished between leases and security interests, and rationally could have
limited protection of security interests to acquisition devices, while contemplat-
ing no such limitation for leases." Id.
1992]
12
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 4 [1992], Art. 10
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol37/iss4/10
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
and treat them in the same manner as other leases. 56 In fact, the legisla-
tive history of section 1110 indicates that the term "lease" should be
interpreted consistently throughout the Code. 5 7 Because Congress pre-
sumably knows how to differentiate between types of leases, the Conti-
nental court concluded that Congress would have qualified the term
"lease" in section 1110 if it had intended the term to apply only to ac-
quisition leases.58
The Continental court also recognized that "accepting Continental's
position would result in arbitrary distinctions and further uncertain-
ties." 59 For example, if Continental sold aircraft to a financier and im-
mediately leased it back under a sale-leaseback transaction, the lease
would not be subject to section 1110. If, however, the same aircraft was
leased by a different air carrier, the lease would be subject to section
1110-.6 0 The court believed that the purpose of the statute-to provide
a "quick and predictable remedy that encourages potential financiers to
be forthcoming"-would best be achieved by following the plain lan-
guage of the statute and applying it to all true leases.
6 1
56. Id. Other sections of the Code do not distinguish between sale-lease-
back transactions and other types of leases. See, e.g., In re Fashion Optical, Ltd.,
653 F.2d 1385, 1388-91 (10th Cir. 1981) (noting that provisions relating to
fraudulent conveyances treat sale-leasebacks same as other leases); In re
Chateaugay Corp., 102 B.R. 335, 343 (Bankr. S.D. N.Y. 1989) (noting that § 365
does not distinguish between sale-leasebacks and other leases).
57. Continental, 932 F.2d at 292-93.
58. Id. at 293.
59. Id. The Second Circuit has recognized the possibility of further ambi-
guity in interpreting § 1110 if the section were to apply only to acquisition de-
vices. See, e.g., In re Pan Am Corp., 125 B.R. 372, 378 (S.D.N.Y.) (suggesting that
future litigation is likely if courts limit protection under § 1110 to acquisition
leases), aff'd per curiam, 929 F.2d 109 (2d Cir. 1991).
60. Continental, 932 F.2d at 293. Because the latter transaction has the same
effect as a sale-leaseback transaction, the court declared that it would be arbi-
trary to make a distinction between these two types of transactions. Id. The
court maintained that the purpose of the statute does not support treating the
sale-leaseback transaction differently from a situation in which aircraft are sold
to a financier and then leased back to a different air carrier. Id.
61. Id. (quoting Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 378). The Continental court agreed with
the Pan Am court by holding that unless the plain language of the statute was
followed, "the benefit sought to be achieved by a statute like § 1110 ... [would]
be lost in a miasma of potential litigation." Id. (quoting Pan Am, 125 B.R. at
378).
The Third Circuit further held that § 1110 applies only to true leases, as
opposed to disguised security interests, noting that under the U.C.C. and other
statutes, "the term 'lease' includes only true leases." Id. at 294. This interpreta-
tion of the term "lease" has been applied to § 1110 and other Code provisions.
See, e.g., In re PCH Assocs., 804 F.2d 193 (2d Cir. 1986) (interpreting "lease"
under §§ 365(d) and 502(b)(6)); Pan Am, 125 B.R. at 380 (interpreting "lease"
under § 1110); In re Chateaugay Corp., 102 B.R. 335, 343-44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1989) (interpreting "lease" under § 365). The difference between security in-
terests and true leases "has long been accepted in commercial and tax law."
Continental, 932 F.2d at 294. The Third Circuit noted that the question of
whether Continental's leases would be characterized as leases or security inter-
892 [Vol. 37: p. 880
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3. Judge Becker's Concurrence
In a concurring opinion, Judge Becker was doubtful that the mean-
ing of section 1110 was "plain."' 62 He concurred, however, with the
majority opinion because he found Continental's position underwhelm-
ing.63 In particular, Judge Becker explained that Continental's argu-
ments were unsuccessful because the legislative history of section 1110
provided evidence "(1) that the sale-leaseback device had long been
used for non-acquisition financing; and (2) that Congress had long been
concerned with the general cost of capital in various transportation in-
dustries and was not just focusing on acquisition financing." 64
III. CONCLUSION
Commentators dispute whether sale-leaseback transactions are sub-
ject to the exemption from the automatic stay in bankruptcy under sec-
tion 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code. 65 The Third Circuit's decision in
Continental, however, is consistent with the two other federal courts that
ests depended upon state or local law. Id. (quoting H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 314 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787; S. REP. No.
989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 26 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5812, 6271).
Since the court was not presented with that issue, however, it left open the ques-
tion of whether any of Continental's leases qualify as true leases. Id. at 285. The
court further stated that it did "not decide the precise standards under which the
bankruptcy court or other court of competent jurisdiction is to decide" the issue
of whether Continental's leases are true leases or disguised security interests.
Id. at 294.
62. Continental, 932 F.2d at 294 (Becker, J., concurring). Judge Becker sug-
gested that the term "lease" usually refers to an acquisition device, and because
the statute refers to other types of acquisition devices, it was unclear whether
Congress intended § 1110 to apply to non-acquisition devices. Id. at 294-95
(Becker, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 295 (Becker, J., concurring).
64. Id. (Becker, J., concurring) (footnote omitted). Judge Becker agreed
with the majority that the legislative history of § 1110 does not support the posi-
tion maintained by Continental. Id. (Becker, J., concurring). He concurred in
the judgment of the court and stated:
Given this equivocal legislative history, it is my view that since the stat-
ute could very well mean what the lessors say it means, the factors
noted above-the failure of Congress clearly to impose the acquisition
limitation which Continental reads into the statute coupled with the fact
that Congress had to know that it might be creating an ambiguity by
leaving the limitation out-are fatal to Continental's position.
Id. (Becker, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
65. See Giddens & Schick, supra note 7, at 123 (suggesting that "section
[1110] may not encompass transactions involving equipment that the airline pre-
viously possessed"); Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2, at 25-26 (arguing
that "[w]here according section 1110 protections to the transaction would en-
courage such financing and where the language of section 1110 clearly covers
the transaction, the sale-leaseback transaction should be entitled to the protec-
tions of section 1110"); Goldman, et al., supra note 4, at 46 (suggesting that
there is an "overall intent to apply [section 1110] . . . only to equipment
acquisitions").
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have decided the issue. 6 6 Moreover, the Continental court's interpreta-
tion of the term "lease," based on its plain meaning and legislative his-
tory, support the decision. 6 7 Congress must now decide whether
section I 110 needs to be rewritten to qualify the term "lease" so that it
only applies to newly acquired aircraft.
The court's opinion in Continental clarifies the situations in which
financiers can repossess their leased aircraft when an air carrier to which
they are leasing goes into bankruptcy. Specifically, repossession will be
possible when an air carrier enters into a sale-leaseback transaction with
a financier, goes into bankruptcy, and then fails to cure its defaults
within the statutory cure period.6 8 A remaining problem, which may be
the source of further litigation, is the question of whether Continental's
leases should be characterized as "true leases" under the Bankruptcy
Code. 69 The Third Circuit was unclear about what factors a court must
consider in characterizing Continental's leases. 70
This decision will have an impact on both airlines and aircraft finan-
ciers. First, financiers will be more willing to enter into lease arrange-
ments with smaller and newer air carriers because they will be assured
that they will be able to repossess their aircraft if the air carrier should
become unable to pay its debts. 7 1 Second, air carriers will be able to get
the financing they need to increase their working capital because finan-
ciers will be less hesitant to enter into sale-leaseback transactions with
them. A disadvantage of the operation of section 1 110 is that it may
interfere with the debtor's business if a majority of its aircraft are repos-
sessed in the event of bankruptcy proceedings.7 2 The Continental court
66. See In re Pan Am Corp., 125 B.R. 372, 380 (S.D.N.Y.) (holding that
§ 1110 applies to sale-leaseback transactions), aff'dper curiam, 929 F.2d 109 (2d
Cir. 1991); In re Braniff, Inc., 110 B.R. 980, 985 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990) (same).
For further discussion of these cases, see supra note 29 and accompanying text.
67. For further discussion of the legislative history of § 1110, see supra
notes 45-61 and accompanying text.
68. For a discussion of § 1110 and the statutory cure period, see supra notes
4 & 6 and accompanying text.
69. As previously stated, only true leases, as opposed to disguised security
interests, are covered under § 1110. Continental, 932 F.2d at 285. Simply calling
a financing arrangement a lease does not necessarily make it a true legal lease.
Whether the arrangement is a lease or a security interest will depend upon the
definition of those terms under the applicable state law as well as the specific
terms of the lease agreement. Id. at 294. Thus, a court may have to examine
Continental's alternative argument that some of its leases are disguised security
interests. For a discussion of Continental's alternative argument, see supra note
23.
70. Continental, 932 F.2d at 294. For a further discussion of the court's
treatment of the "true" lease issue, see supra note 23 and accompanying text.
71. For further discussion of how this impact is consistent with the legisla-
tive history of § 1110, see supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
72. The problem with § 1110 arises when an air carrier goes into bank-
ruptcy and is unable to cure its debts within the 60-day statutory cure period. In
such a situation, the financier is entitled to repossess the aircraft if the lease
arrangement provides for such a remedy. Gerstell & Hoff-Patrinos, supra note 2,
894 [Vol. 37: p. 880
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did not address this issue in its opinion. Nevertheless, this decision
seems to effectuate Congress' purpose behind section 1110, which is to
allow airlines to meet their equipment needs at a decreased cost.
Sherri L. Albert
at 4. This benefit to financiers becomes a detriment to other creditors and to the
continuing business of the air carrier. Id.
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